

Media in Transition: Globalization and Convergence, an International
Conference
10-12 May 2002

**Germany Goes Global:
Challenging the Theory of Hollywood's Dominance on
International Markets**

Joseph Garnarcz (University of Cologne, Germany)

1.

There are a variety of theories which deal with Hollywood's international role, e. g., by Colin Hoskins and Rolf Mirus or by Steven S. Wildman and Stephen E. Siwek.¹ However, all these theories share a fundamental error: they attempt to explain a phenomenon of which they simply assume that it is the case, namely that Hollywood films have dominated the world markets since the 1910s. I would like to demonstrate that for Germany, at least, this assumption is unfounded: Hollywood films did not become consistently popular with German audiences until the 1980s. When we revise the theory of Hollywood as the most successful global player, it becomes possible to construct a middle range theory which not only fits the empirical facts better, but also has a dynamic aspect and an explanatory value for the popularity of films on export markets.

For the purpose of constructing a new theory of the popularity of Hollywood films on international markets, we have to revise the existing research on a conceptual as well as on an empirical level. Firstly, I will

argue that the widely accepted hypothesis of the global dominance of US movies has been constructed on a research design which confuses supply and demand, thus excluding the crucial role of audiences *per se*. Secondly, I will reconstruct and interpret the process of change in the popularity of Hollywood films in Germany based on thoroughly compiled data which measures the demand for films by German audiences. Thirdly, I will give an explanation for the increasing popularity of US films in Germany by looking not only at the economic and political elites as global players but also, and even primarily, at the changing tastes of German audiences. Lastly, based on the German case study, I would like to propose a new theory of how Hollywood gained its dominance on international markets.

2.

The research design that guides work on the world-wide dominance of US films is not explicated. Neither Kristin Thompson nor Thomas Guback reflect on their research design.² When made explicit, it becomes clear how problematic it is. My central argument is, that the usual concepts limit the empirical enquiry from the outset in such a way that results which conform to the research frame are generated almost automatically.

The concept of how the conquest of the world market is achieved is based solely on the level of elites, i. e. of economic and political leaders. In the "global flow patterns of films", the primary factors are political and economic ones; cultural factors are only of secondary concern.³ Thompson emphasizes economic activity. For Guback, the concerted action of the US government and the US film industry guaranteed the

international success of Hollywood films. When examining the relationship between the exporting and the importing country, only the large exporting country is credited with playing a significant role; the smaller importing country is described as nothing but a black box or at most as playing a defensive role.⁴ The players that engage in an active economic policy are therefore only the US elites. The European film industries or governments do not hold a position as agents, but at most one as defenders, who limit the import of US films with the help of protectionist measures (e.g., protective duty, import quotas, screening time quotas).

In these concepts of the global circulation of films the audience's power and also that of the smaller importing countries' film industries is almost totally ignored. When the audience is taken into account, it is merely presented as a function of film supply or as a compliant object of political interests: the audience watches what the elites of the US film industry want it to watch. The economic law implied here is that "demand follows supply". However, it is absolutely plausible that the US film industry threw a large supply of films on foreign markets without a large audience ever taking interest in them (e. g. because these films had already returned their costs on the domestic market or for image reasons, i. e. for the purpose of gaining a market advantage on a medium- or long-term basis). In these discourses, only the film industry's market dominance and not the films' popularity is of any consistent interest.

In the context of such a concept, which allows only US economic and political elites to function as players, it becomes clear that until now research has only used data to measure film supply: the US film industry is regarded as dominant on a foreign market, when the supplied (premiered or censored) US films represent more than half or at least the greatest part of the total film supply of all the countries who have a share

in that market.⁵

Based on the explicated research design and the sources used, international research has held on to an idea that could be termed as "the standard model". The standard model of the global success of the US film industry maintains that since the mid 1910s Hollywood films have been more popular all over the world than the respective national films. It postulates that Germany is a special case, because the triumphant advance of US films set in late in Germany: the US film industry did not attain its market dominance there until the mid 1920s, and moreover, the market dominance of US film was interrupted by the National Socialist regime.

3.

The basic idea of my concept is that of a figuration of interdependent social groups or countries, like the one Norbert Elias developed in his work.⁶ A useful research design assumes an interdependent relationship between elites and audiences, an exporting and an importing country without defining the nature of the relationship from the start; it neither presupposes a one-sided process *per se*, nor does it exclude the possibility that such a process may be essentially one-sided *de facto*. In whatever direction the dependence in the relationship may be shifted, it is understood that no part is imaginable without the other. Even if one assumes a dependence situation in which one part has total control and the other no control whatsoever of the process, the actions of both parts result from the interdependence in the relationship.

In this concept of interdependence, not only the film industry, but also the audience must be regarded as being an empirical variable. When

studying US films on foreign markets the results directly depend on whether one has a clear concept of the audience or not. My hypothesis is, that past research has led to inadequate results, because it was not guided by an empirical and historical concept of the audience. An audience is a figuration of people constituted by the reception of a certain film. The empirical audience is not an unchanging variable, because its preferences are shaped by cultural traditions, so that audiences in different countries or times like different films, respectively. Cinema-goers select films on the basis of values: at the box office, they decide in favor of films that promise the maximum entertainment value in their view. Films are entertaining when they reflect values that are shared by the members of an audience, because spectators enjoy that which provides an essential affirmation of their opinions and feelings. It is definitely not only advertising, but primarily the communication of values by "word of mouth" that is of relevance for the selection process of films at the box office.⁷ If a film was liked, if it was enjoyed, it will be recommended to others.

It is necessary to examine the actual audience, because a national cinema can only exist under market-economy conditions if it can win the audience it addresses. When the audience is not conceptualized as a black box, but as a shaping, selecting force on which a film industry depends, it is appropriate to stress the popularity of films rather than the market dominance as crucial for economic success and cultural influence. The concept of popularity must be defined in an empirical or - more precisely - in an empirically-comparative manner: a certain film is more popular than another if more people saw it. Statistics on the number of tickets sold or surveys among exhibitors on cinema attendance can be used as sources to calculate a film's success. Such ranking lists show how the audience actually responded to a specific film

supply.

4.

When our concept of the audience is established empirically and historically, one arrives at more adequate models of the role of US film on foreign markets as an indicator of a globalization process. On the basis of German ranking lists, it is possible to revise the standard model and to replace it with a new model, which describes the change in the national origin of popular films in Germany more adequately. Contrary to usual expectations, US films did not surpass German films in popularity as early as the 1910s. In fact, a popularity of German films comes to light that remains unbroken until the beginning of the 1960s.⁸ By examining the films that are popular with German audiences, three phases can be identified, each defined by the respective country that supplies the greatest number of successful films: between 1925 (the first year in which data could be collected) and 1963 German films were unrivalled in popularity: the overwhelming majority of successful films were German or Austrian productions. In the second phase, between 1964 to 1979, films from neighboring Western-European countries were favored by German audiences - for this reason I have called it the "European phase". Since the beginning of the 1970s, however, US films have gained more and more popularity. In the third phase, beginning in 1980, US films have become as popular as German films had been in the first phase.

This analysis of a great transformation of popular cinema in Germany can be formulated even more precisely with respect to two aspects. Firstly, a comparison with films that were successful on German

television shows that the special form of the transformation is specific to cinema. On television, US films also became increasingly successful, but in the 1980s, the biggest successes were actually the same German films that had been successful in cinemas in the 1950s. Secondly, one can compare the development on the German film market with that on the neighboring European countries' film markets: in the large Continental-European film-producing countries France and Italy, the popularity of their national films was replaced by that of US films at about the same time. In the 1950s, movie audiences of these countries preferred films from their own countries. However, from the 1980s onwards, practically all smash hits in Central Europe are Hollywood productions. In Germany, however, the transformation process began sooner and was more marked. Furthermore, it can be shown that the process of globalization on European film markets is also one of European integration: the number of films that were equally successful in all these European countries rose significantly in the 1980s. While in the 1950s it was still an exception when a movie made it into the top ten in all three countries, up to 40% of the top ten films in all three countries have been the same Hollywood movies since the 1980s. Thus, this process of global cultural integration is much more than a process of Americanization; it can be interpreted as a process of European integration with Hollywood as its main instrument.

5.

In the context of the standard model, which postulates that the US film industry attained global dominance as early as the 1910s, two explanations are offered (of which only the first explanation is elaborated

in the research literature, the second remaining marginal). Are these explanations of value for understanding the triumphant advance of US film, which I have identified as setting in much later in Germany, namely in the 1970s and 1980s, or must these explanations also be re-conceptualized, when the audience is defined empirically and historically?

Both of the proposed explanations see the reasons for the US film industry's attainment of dominance in Europe during the 1910s in general social factors, especially in the political interference set to restrain the free play of economic forces and the free choice of the cinema-goers.

(1) The supply-oriented approach maintains that the economic strength of the US film industry and the relative weakness of the national film industries led to a world-wide dominance of the US film industry that existed for decades. Because of certain factors, such as the consistent orientation towards market success and the formation of cartels, the US film industry is considered superior to those in Europe concerning its economic structure. Due to the restraint of trade during the World Wars, US films were kept out of the German market by force. Inflation "naturally" isolated the German import market after WWI. After the political pressure had been released and the general economic situation had stabilized, the forces of the film market could develop freely: because of its structural weakness, the German film industry was immediately defeated by the US one.

This explanation is based on a concept in which the film industry of the exporting country has all the power, its sphere of influence only being checked by the political or general economic interference of the importing country. This explanation is not compatible with facts that come to light with the help of research that is guided by different concepts and oriented towards an empirically and historically defined

audience. If the US film industry really always was structurally superior to the one in Germany, then the success of German and the failure of US films in the first phase provides evidence against the hypothesis that the economic performance of German and US films was the result of the unequal power of the respective national film industries.

(2) The second approach simply states that US films were always internationally successful because they were "better" than the national productions of the European countries. This concept also fails to acknowledge an empirical, historical audience. In fact, no proof is given that the contemporary German audience judged US films as being "better" in quality. Authors determine quality subjectively, by projecting present standards on the past without reflecting on their historical distance. Barry Salt regards films with a more dynamic tempo and a more natural acting style as "better" and simply assumes that the European audience of the 1920s shared this view.⁹

However, since German audiences at that time actually preferred German films, they must have judged German films as being "better" than those from the USA (unless one is prepared to assume that a national audience consistently decides in favor of films it does not like). The identification of the characteristics of German and US films from the 1920s (theatricality vs. spontaneity of acting, slow-moving vs. fast-paced) is based on close observations and is therefore accurate enough, but the status of these characteristics for which the respective national cinemas stand has changed. Today's generation judges Hollywood cinema of the 1920s as being "better" than its German counterpart, because it is less theatrical and has a faster pace. But since the German audience actually preferred German films in the first phase, it obviously valued the slow-moving pace of German films and the theatrical style of German actors more highly than it did the fast-paced

US films and the natural style of US actors.¹⁰

6.

How can we develop an explanation for the change in popularity of films in Germany that avoids falling into the traps of past explanations? There is a simple solution for the discussed problems: a highly developed film export industry will not be very successful as long as the members of the addressed foreign audience share values that are incompatible with the supplied films. Even a structurally inferior domestic film industry will be more successful as long as it supplies films that cater to the audience's cultural preferences. One has to relate a film industry and its audience, i.e. supply and demand, to each other. Generally speaking, two plausible reasons for a change in the success of films deserve consideration: the national origins of films that were popular in Germany may have changed because of a change in the film supply from different film-producing countries or because of a change in the preferences of the German audience.

1. Hypothesis: Change in Supply

The quantitative film supply differentiated by producing country provides no explanation for the change in the national origin of popular films. There is a significant change in the popularity of US films in Germany, whereas there was little change in the number of those films supplied per year.¹¹ If the change in the composition of popular films in Germany is connected to film supply, it could therefore only be the result

of a difference in the quality of these films.¹²

Generally speaking, we may note that the demand in films by German cinema-goers has not changed since the 1920s with respect to at least one characteristic: the ranking lists show a clear tendency towards popular films with narrative integration, generic differentiation, presentation of stars and providing an entire evening of entertainment for a mass audience. This demand was met by the German film industry until the early 1960s: films were produced continuously and in relatively unchanging numbers per year, under principles such as the division of labor and the producer-unit system of organization. While the USA and the European countries continued the production of popular narrative films and their supply in Germany, this system collapsed in Germany in the 1970s. With the exception of a very small number of films, e. g. *Bis zur bitteren Neige* (1975) and *Steiner - Das eiserne Kreuz* (1976), the remaining production of the narrative kind consisted almost entirely of films that were cheaply produced, had no stars, showed no technical or creative effort, were often sex comedies, and usually commercial failures. The majority of films made in this period belong to the New German Cinema movement: an *auteur* cinema with little success at the box office. The New German Cinema broke with the film form as well as with the mode of production that the popular narrative cinema had established. Instead of being generically differentiated, star-oriented, and entertaining, films now reflected the experiences of their *auteurs*, were unconventional in style and committed to critical themes. The break with popular German cinema's mode of production expressed itself in the fact that striving for a profit, which is the basis of any commercial film production, was thought of as being an "out-dated fetish".¹³ The new German film makers (with their spokesman, the lawyer Alexander Kluge) successfully fought for production conditions that were

independent of the market economy, and for which the German theater system with its subsidies and directors having artistic control served as a model. Furthermore, the rejection of German entertainment-cinema was connected to a self-image that sought its ideals in literary rather than cinematic traditions. These film makers saw themselves as authors, and they strove to cross the boundaries between author, director and producer by practicing a craft-like mode of production.

In contrast to the other European countries, the break with popular narrative cinema is more radical in Germany because of a generational conflict: the film makers of the New German Cinema movement had all been born in the Third Reich. The motor of this generational conflict was the criticism of the role the parent generation had played in National Socialism. The new generation postulated acting on one's own responsibility and held their parents morally responsible for their participation, sense of duty and blind support. They therefore disapproved of almost everything their parents had created. Thus the new film makers identified popular German cinema completely with the Nazis, because many directors of the 1950s had formerly been successful in the Third Reich, and they therefore rejected it without exception.¹⁴

The generation of Germans born in the Third Reich were able to decide the conflict in their favor so quickly and consistently only because the parent generation hardly gave any resistance. The directors of the popular German cinema, who had all been born during the *Kaiserreich*, retired in the early 1970s. There were no generations in between, because after the victory over the National Socialist regime, there was no training in film making in Germany until 1966.

Thus foreign films were selected by the German audience, because they followed the conventions of popular narrative cinema, which were no longer observed by German film makers since the 1970s. Films about

World War II such as *A Bridge Too Far* (1977), tear-jerkers such as *Love Story* (1970/71) or films especially addressed to young children such as the Disney movies, which Germany had itself produced in great numbers during the 1950s and 1960s and which were very popular with German audiences, were increasingly supplied by Hollywood during the 1970s. Thus, Hollywood films became more popular with German audiences, because their tastes had not changed fundamentally concerning such types of movies, and German film makers were no longer supplying them.

However, this explanation is not sufficient in itself. If foreign films were merely a replacement for the kinds of movies German audiences had favored for decades but which young German film makers now failed to supply, this would not explain why US films and not those from other countries won the race.

2. Hypothesis: Change in Demand

In fact, not only did German film production increasingly lose sight of its audience in the 1970s, the audience also changed its preferences, so that older German films were regarded as out-dated. If an audience enjoys films that affirm its opinions and feelings, then the selection process of films at the box office will change along with an audience's values. At the beginning of the 1960s, i.e. before the change in the composition of popular films in Germany, a profound change in the values of young people set in - and these young people represented the majority of cinema-goers since the establishment of television.¹⁵ This change in preferences made cinema-goers turn to Hollywood films, because these films expressed this new orientation in values like no others did. To the

extent that movies from other countries also followed these standards, they too became popular in Germany, e.g. the British James Bond film-series.

Two groups of values were involved in the change in Germany: values of duty and acceptance on the one hand and values of self-realization on the other. Both groups differ concerning the degree in which they see individuals as being dependent on one another. Values of duty and acceptance are values that place the demands of a group (e. g. school, church, military, state) above those of the individual, i.e. values such as discipline, obedience, a sense of duty, loyalty, subordination and self-control. Values of self-realization are values that place the demands of an individual above those of the group to which he or she belongs, i.e. values such as self-sufficiency, self-realization, pleasure for its own sake and fulfillment of emotional needs. The trend in the German value-change was a movement away from the shrinking duty and acceptance values towards the expanding self-realization values.¹⁶

US films were preferred because they gave expression to the values of self-realization, which were now favored by the new generation. The protagonists of many Hollywood films function as motors for the films' plot and they control events. "The character wants something. The desire sets up a goal, and the course of the narrative's development will most likely involve the process of achieving that goal."¹⁷ In addition to the value of self-sufficiency, the value of pleasure for its own sake is also fulfilled in Hollywood films: "Hollywood's delight in movement for its own sake ensures that nearly every movie has at least one sequence which displays action or physical expertise as a production value, interrupting narrative and challenging its dominance."¹⁸ Furthermore, Hollywood films emotionalize their spectators to a great extent. This is what the German audience since the 1970s valued more highly than it

had before.

Characteristics such as self-sufficiency, pleasure for its own sake and emotional involvement especially apply to the type of film that had never been a cornerstone of German film production and that helped establish US films in Germany in the 1970s and early 1980s: adventure and action films such as *Jaws* (1976), *Star Wars* (1978) and *Superman* (1979) which were addressed to a young male audience. Films that belong to this group present spectacular physical action, which is usually carried along by a male hero. They express values that were favored more than before, i.e. taking matters into one's own hands in a goal-oriented manner and handling them successfully on one's own. Furthermore, special effects are often important production values of these films. More often than not, the story of these films can be summed up in a few words; these films' appeal lies not solely in the story but in their spectacular action and special effects, which are heightened from film to film. Naturally, these films end with the hero's reaching his goal.

In the course of the change in values, older Hollywood films and stars clearly became as popular as never before with German audiences. The US top star John Wayne, who represents values such as independence and self-determination, and whose Westerns also always present action for its own sake, was no success with German audiences for years. It was not until the change in values in the 1970s that John Wayne became a top star in Germany as well - a star favored by a young audience which saw Wayne's films on TV.

Older German films, which expressed values of duty and acceptance, increasingly fell into disfavor with young audiences during the 1970s and 1980s when they were shown on TV. Contrary to classical Hollywood films, it is often the case in German films that the plot is not driven on by the protagonist, but that the protagonist is driven by

something, so to speak.¹⁹ Many German films - to name only a few classic ones from the period of the Weimar Republic: *Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari* (1919), *Der letzte Mann* (1924), *Der heilige Berg* (1926), *Der Student von Prag* (1926), *Der blaue Engel* (1930/31) - show such antiheroes that are driven by social conditions or inner compulsions. This fatalism is even a characteristic of entire genres, e.g. the *Kammerspielfilm*, the *Trümmerfilm* and the *Heimatsfilm*. In one of the most successful films of the 1950s, *Grün ist die Heide* (1951), which served as a model for many German post-war films, the protagonist is driven by various forces (he has to leave East-Germany for West-Germany and suffers from an inner compulsion for poaching). The protagonists passively give in to fate. There is no happy end to the most popular love-story of the Weimar period, *Der Kongreß tanzt* (1931): The romance with the Russian Czar (played by Willy Fritsch) is over, and his lover (played by Lilian Harvey), the glove-maker Christl Weininger, has to submit to the rules of social standing and sacrifice her love.

Even though the change described here was in part brought about by conscious decisions of individuals, the result - the change in the national origins of the successful films in German cinema - was not planned by any of the groups involved. Neither the audience, nor the US or the German film industry had this goal. The US film industry had certainly always aimed to conquer the European film markets. But only when factors came into play on which the US film industry had no influence, i.e. collapse of the popular German cinema, changes in the demographics and values of the German audience, could it achieve this goal.

7.

It has been demonstrated how results concerning the globalization process of the film industry depend directly on the research design used. When we want to gain adequate knowledge about this globalization process, we have to base our research on an empirical and historical concept of the audience, because it is the audience that decides which films become more successful than others, even though these decisions are always made on the basis of the film supply that the film industries provide. In the context of such a concept of the interdependence of various social groups (film industry elites, audience) and countries (importing and exporting) we arrive at a new and more adequate model of the global role of US films.

Thus, in conclusion, a general theory of the success of foreign films on export-markets may be constructed on the basis of the German example, a theory of middle range, which has an explanatory as well as a prognostic value for the popularity of foreign films and its change.

Let us make the following assumptions: 1) Both film production and reception take place on a free market. 2) The national audience only selects films that correspond to its own cultural value-standards. 3) The economic strength of a national film industry is measurable with the help of certain variables, such as the size of its domestic market, the formation of cartels, a consistent market-orientation etc.

Unequal economic power of two rival national film industries is a secondary factor for the success of their films in any given market compared to the films' cultural acceptability for a target audience. Cultural affinity between the producing and the importing country is the necessary precondition for the exported films to become popular. When a cultural affinity exists between a large exporting and a small importing country, competition advantages can be gained by a market structure that

is developed better (e.g. consistent orientation towards market success, formation of cartels, protectionist measures by the government) and through the size of the respective market, because the larger an audience is, the more investments (e.g. stars, creative personnel, special effects) can be made in the production of films. The most successful national film industry will then be the one that produces films which have the greatest cultural affinity with the importing countries, that has the strongest economic production system, and that has the largest domestic market. The economic strength of a film industry increases in the same degree that the audience grows through a process of cultural assimilation. The greater the global cultural acceptance of US films is, the higher the investments in US films may be. Under the condition that the foreign audience is culturally compatible with US popular film culture, the economic strength of the US film industry is a competition advantage, which is then further increased by the expansion of the US film market across country borders. Thus, the globalization process of the film industry led by the US gains momentum and longevity.

Translation by Annemone Ligensa

About the author:

Joseph Garnearz is *Privatdozent* in Film Studies at the University of Cologne in Germany. His main subject of study is European film history and he has published widely on this topic in British, American and German journals and edited collections. His dissertation on film versions was published as *Filmfassungen* (Frankfurt: Lang, 1992). His post-

doctoral thesis *Importing Entertainment: The Internationalization of German Film Culture, 1925-1990*, on which this paper is partly based, is not yet published. He is currently working on two books, *The Emergence of Cinema in Germany, 1895-1924* and *German Cinema: A History*.

Endnotes

1. Colin Hoskins and Rolf Mirus, Reasons for the US dominance of the international trade in television programs, *Media, Culture and Society*, Vol. 10, [1988], 499-515; Steven S. Wildman and Stephen E. Siwek, *International Trade in Films and Television Programs*, Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988.
2. Thomas H. Guback, *The International Film Industry: Western Europe and America since 1945* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969); Kristin Thompson, *Exporting Entertainment* (London: BFI, 1986).
3. See e. g. Taeyoung Kang, "Films in International Circulation: Economic Aspects and Cultural Implications in a Cross-national Comparative Study" (Unpublished Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin: 1989).
4. e. g. Janet Staiger, Douglas Gomery, "The History of World Cinema: Models for Economic Analysis", *Film Reader*, 4, (1979), 35-44.
5. Thomas Elsaesser, "Kunst und Krise: Die Ufa in den 20er Jahren", *Das Ufa-Buch*, Hans-Michael Bock and Michael Töteberg (eds.) (Frankfurt a. M.: Zweitausendeins, 1992), pp. 100-130, "In the mid 1920s the Americans have a share of up to 40% of the German market, in spite of a surplus in production in Germany. The concrete figures are: 1923: 24.5%; 1924: 33.2%; 1925: 40.7%; 1926: 44.5% (...)" (p. 103, trans.). In this example Thomas Elsaesser draws the conclusion that the US film industry had a share of up to 40% of the German film market from the fact that the percentage of US films related to the total number of films supplied represented about 40%; the share of US films related to the national supply is taken as evidence for demand and thus for the popularity of US film.
6. Norbert Elias, *Was ist Soziologie?* (München: Juventa, 1970); Norbert Elias, *Die Gesellschaft der Individuen* (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1987); *Diskussionsbeiträge IS/TUB*, Institut für Soziologie an der Technischen Universität Berlin (ed.), Bd. 6: Norbert Elias, *Über die Begriffe der Figuration und der sozialen Prozesse: Einführende Bemerkungen zu einem Colloquium über den historischen Charakter der Gesellschaft und die soziologische Theorie am 12. Mai 1987 in der Technischen Universität Berlin, veranstaltet vom Institut für Soziologie* (Berlin: IS/TUB, 1987); Norbert Elias, "Figuration", *Grundbegriffe der Soziologie*, Bernhard Schäfers (ed.) (Opladen: UTB, 1986), pp. 88-91.

-
7. Representative surveys conducted in the second half of the 1950s and early 1960s agree, that the decisive factor for the selection of films at the box office is not advertising, but the oral recommendation based on the spectator's own reception of the respective film. See Hermann Busch, "Der Absatz in der Filmwirtschaft unter dem Einfluß des Fernsehens", Unpublished Dissertation (Mannheim: 1962), p. 32.
 8. I have already demonstrated this in the article "Hollywood in Germany: The Role of American Films in Germany", *Hollywood in Europe*, David W. Ellwood and Rob Kroes (eds.) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1994), pp. 94-135. In contrast to this article, I differentiate three and not two phases here (the European phase is added).
 9. Barry Salt, *Film Style and Technology: History and Analysis* (London: Starword, 1983), p. 132.
 10. See Juri Tsivian, "Caligari in Rußland: Der deutsche Expressionismus und die sowjetische Filmkultur", *montage/av*, 2/2 (1993), 35-48, "Since the 1910s the Russians regarded American cinema as being vulgar and crude. The hectic tempo of American films as well as their emphasis on action and stunts made it impossible to connect them to any cultural tradition. American cinema, it was generally agreed, was closer to sports or circus than to art." (p. 38, trans.)
 11. Only the quantitative increase in European film supply that set in shortly before the second phase, and for which a lack of new German and US films is thought to be responsible, has a certain explanatory value.
 12. Tino Balio, *Grand Design: Hollywood as a Modern Business Enterprise* (Berkeley et. al.: University of California Press, 1995), uses the term "production trends". In my opinion, it would be useful to differentiate between "trends in supply" and "trends in success".
 13. Alfred Andersch, "Räte, Kommissionen und 'Förderungs'-Anstalten ersticken das Kino", *Konkret*, (Aug. 1977), 36.
 14. Edgar Reitz, "Das Kino der Autoren lebt", *Liebe zum Kino*, Edgar Reitz (ed.) (Köln: Köln 78, [1985]), pp. 117-124: "But the totalitarian regime of mediocrity, a special cultural inheritance of the Third Reich, still existed without change in German film. The idea of *auteur* cinema, practiced by the directors of the *nouvelle vague*, gave us hope of renouncing this Nazi inheritance. At last we can understand the lifestyle of our generation as a productive force." (p. 117, trans.).
 15. See Stephanie Henseler, *Soziologie des Kinopublikums*, (Frankfurt a. M. et al.: Peter Lang, 1987), pp. 33-38.
 16. Helmut Klages, *Wertorientierungen im Wandel: Rückblick, Gegenwartsanalyse, Prognosen*, Frankfurt a. M. et. al.: Campus, 1984; *Wertedynamik: Über die Wandelbarkeit des Selbstverständlichen*, Zürich: Edition Interfrom, 1988.

-
17. David Bordwell, Kristin Thompson, *Film Art: An Introduction*, New York et al.: McGraw-Hill, 1993, p. 82.
 18. Richard Maltby, *Hollywood Cinema: An Introduction*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 239.
 19. See Walter Schmieding, *Kunst und Kasse: Der Ärger mit dem deutschen Film*, Hamburg: Rütten & Loening, 1961, pp. 79ff.